I had seen some pretty high-power reviews of David Kilcullen’s The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One
Kilcullen begins the book with a very thorough description of the accidental guerrilla. In a nutshell, an accidental guerrilla is someone who falls into violent terrorist or insurgent ways due mainly to his economic, sociological, political and religious environments. I think one of Kilcullen’s main points is that proper counterinsurgency actions both reduce the number of existing accidental guerrillas and reduce the likelihood of the creation of future accidental guerrillas, hus increasing security.
Chapter Two covers the author’s experiences with counterinsurgency actions in Afghanistan from 2006-2008. He contrasts them with the at-times inappropriate and insurgency-causing counterterrorism actions taken by the West (or at least, the part of the West fighting in Afghanistan). Chapter Three covers part of the Surge in Iraq in 2007; again describing the effectiveness of counterinsurgency actions. Both of these chapters are very detailed and include very thorough references. Kilcullen was operating at a level in both countries which allowed him an effective balance between on the ground experience and access to high-level military and diplomatic leaders. Because of this, his observations, analyses, criticisms and prognostications may be more likely to be accurate. Chapter Four surveys insurgencies and counterinsurgency actions in smaller regions from Europe to Indonesia. Both Chapter Five and the Conclusion discuss, again in great and interesting detail, how to move from counterterrorism to counterinsurgency actions, when and where needed.
The depth of The Accidental Guerrilla is in no way represented by this brief review. The analysis work that Kilcullen has done on the causes of insurgency, the differences between insurgent and terrorist actions, the potential and real undesirable effects of counterterrorism actions against insurgents, and the way to move military, political and diplomatic actions towards counterinsurgency when needed is very detailed, documented well in the text and presented well to the reader. Reading this book and thinking about its implications both in the areas Kilcullen described and here in Mexico was like taking a very intense university course, in that the material was thorough, well-prepared and well-presented.
For indepth reviews, see The NY Times, thearmchairgeneral.com, The Economist (below a review of Ricks’ The Gamble), Bacevich’s criticism and Kilcullen’s response.
this weekend in Santa Fe. Started reading it just to fill in a few minutes, then couldn’t stop reading it. Apologies to all those who’s earlier recommendations of this book to me went unheeded until now. You were all correct. 
. Khan starts right off in 1946, with nods back to the end of WWII in 1945 and the connections amongst the end of the war, Britain’s failing power and the unrest in India. The book is ordered chronologically, although the ten main chapters cover four years, so there’s not an immediate sense of temporal progress as you read. That’s OK. Khan is not trying to speed through anything.
. I finally broke down and ordered a new copy (pre-reading thanks to Dan C. and Meghan B. for the ringing endorsements). During my last search though, I found Karl E. Meyer’s 
. Turns out, this was a great book to read right after the Genghis Khan title (see previous entry). Meyer and his wife Shareen Blair Brysac also authored the larger, more detailed 
(which I’ll eventually read, to complement 
covers the historical/political backdrop to the genesis of the Taliban, their history through mid-1999, their place in and affect on Islam, and the world’s reaction to them (the New Great Game). It also has some great reference tools in the appendices.